FUTURES IN PINDAR

I

J. WACKERNAGEL[1] and E. Löfstedt[2] have both drawn attention to Pindar's 'Neigung, das Futurum zu setzen bei Verben, die eine jetzt vorhandene, aber auf zukünftiges Tun abzielende Willensrichtung ausdrücken'. But they regarded this as a purely grammatical phenomenon, and did not note that the Pindaric use is practically limited to statements of the type, 'I shall sing, glorify, testify, etc.'. It was E. Bundy[3] who first drew attention to the conventional nature of these futures and so ended years of misunderstanding. So, for example, Wilamowitz[4] considered that ἀρέομαι P. 1. 75 represented an optative with ἄν, while Slotty,[5] following Breyer, thought that ὑμνήσω N. 9. 10 was an aorist subjunctive 'auf Grund des pindarischen Sprachgebrauches'! Postgate,[6] following Gildersleeve, thought that ἐρέω O. 8. 57 represented ἔχω εἰπεῖν, though the contrary would appear to be more true, cf. O. 13. 11: and also Hoekstra[7] sees in the future 'den Nebenbegriff des Könnens'. Few could afford the certainty of Farnell[8] on πίομαι O. 6. 86; 'in spite of the long iota this form has a present meaning, not a future'. Finally the error of H. Fränkel[9] is illuminating, when he talks of Alkman, fr. 1. 39 Page (not to be compared to Sappho, fr. 16. 17 L.-P.) ἐγὼν δ' ἀείδω Ἀγιδῶς τὸ φῶς as being in 'echt pindarischer Weise'. He gives three parallels, all futures or future equivalents, which prove the contrary. There is in fact no exact parallel for ἀείδω in Pindar. But those who sought to explain away these futures were not so mistaken as those who determined to take them literally, and see in κελαδήσω O. 11. 14 a prediction of O. 10 while turning a blind eye to κελαδησόμεθ' in O. 10. 79.[10]

We must also take into consideration two connected phenomena:

(a) ἐθέλω with the infinitive is used to represent such a future,[11] e.g. ἐθέλει ποιμαίνειν O. 11. 9, and in O. 7. 20 the periphrasis is further intensified ἐθελήσω—διορθῶσαι.[12]

(b) The imperative, addressed to the poet himself and/or his chorus, or his Muse, or to no one in particular, may also be used with the same effect,[13] e.g. ἀπὸ φόρμιγγα λάμβανε O. 1. 18 = φόρμιγγα λήψομαι just as στάσομαι N. 5. 16 = στᾶσον Bacch. 5. 177.

[1] Vorlesungen über Syntax, Basel, 1920, part 1, p. 61.
[2] Syntactica ii, Malmö, 1956, p. 127.
[3] Studia Pindarica I, Univ. of California Publ. in Class. Phil., Berkeley, 1962, p. 21.
[4] S.B.B., 1901, p. 1306.
[5] Der Gebrauch des Konjunktives, Göttingen, 1915, p. 122.
[6] Mnemosyne liii (1925), p. 390.
[7] Ibid. ser. 4, xv (1962), p. 5.
[8] The Works of Pindar, vol. 2, A Critical Commentary, London, 1932, ad loc.
[9] Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens, München, 1955, p. 90³, (abbreviated W & F).
[10] So van Groningen, La Composition lit-téraire archaïque grecque, Amsterdam, 1960², p. 343.
[11] Schwyzer–Debrunner, Gr. Gr. 2. 293. 8: S. Radt, Pindars Zweiter und Sechster Paean, Amsterdam, 1958, p. 74 on Paean 2. 79: Wackernagel, Vorlesungen, i. 195.
[12] For an explanation, v. Löfstedt, Syntactica ii. 127–8 with literature: parallels may be found in Bruhn's Anhang to Sophocles, p. 61, but P. 3. 41 τλάσομαι is exactly similar.
[13] A comparison of the openings of the Homeric hymns shows that the introduction was stylized either as an imperative addressed to the Muse, or as a first person future.

Therefore Wilamowitz,[1] with the approval of Schadewaldt[2] among others, could only interpret N. 2. 24–5 by inventing a komos ('es wird eben athenische Sitte gewesen sein') to follow N. 2, and ignored κωμάξομαι at the end of I. 4, as indeed does H. Fränkel,[3] who maintains, 'Dieses kurzes Lied war dazu bestimmt, da capo ad infinitum wiederholt zu werden': but he had already given an explanation of naive ring composition.[4]

The explanation for the imperative-future statements was offered by Schadewaldt in a different context.[5] The imperative εἶπον O. 6. 92 he explained 'weil Pindar—naiv alles von dem Augenblick aus erfasst und gestaltet, in dem er dichtet: für diesen ist das ganze Fest zukünftig, sind die Imperative verständlich'. But his remarks on N. 2. 25 show that he did not apply this view to other imperatives, let alone the futures.

The explanation is only half the truth. It would have been better to say conventional—or in the terminology of Schadewaldt–Schroeder, *dem Programme gemäss*—rather than naïve. Secondly the poem cannot be formulated *in dem Augenblick in dem Pindar dichtet*. This would stand in contradiction to another of the conventional utterances of the chorus, that of the type κατέβαν, ἔμολον, ἦλθον (that all these mean the same, I take as understood; the differences sought by Wilamowitz and repeated by his followers to justify their preconceptions about Pindar's movements, are simply non-existent).[6] That this aorist is also conventional has long been recognized, principally by Schadewaldt[7] and von der Mühll,[8] though their remarks about it are only partially true. The full phrase (variants such as ἔρχομαι... ἀπύων in O. 5. 19 are rare) would seem to be ἤλυθον ἐς χορόν *Parth*. 2. 38,[9] with a host of periphrases, ἔβαν μάρτυς, κάρυξ, τιμάορος, ἄγγελος, ἐπίκουρος, ταμίας, with a future or present participle, or simply σὺν Χάρισιν I. 5. 21. Von der Mühll notes the variants *Ὧραι . . . μ' ἔπεμψαν . . . μάρτυρ' ἀέθλων O. 4. 2 and similarly O. 10. 24.

Thirdly, it is wrong to think of an Augenblick as Schadewaldt did; and even Wilamowitz[10] says of N. 7, 'Alles ist auf den Augenblick berechnet, wo das Lied auf dem Hofe Thearions gesungen wird'. On the contrary, many odes are built dramatically, e.g. N. 3.

[1] *Pindaros*, Berlin, 1922, p. 158.

[2] *Der Aufbau des pindarischen Epinikion, Halle*, 1928, p. 296[1], abbreviated Schadewaldt.

[3] *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums*, München, 1962[2], p. 488[6], abbreviated *D & P*.

[4] *W & F*, p. 71.

[5] Schadewaldt, p. 296[1], but also implied in Wilamowitz, *Pindaros*, 402[2]. Schadewaldt was defending the text against the emendations of Wilamowitz, but that the point of his remarks has not been seen is clear from the arbitrary interpretation of B. Forssman, *Untersuchungen zur Sprache Pindars*, Wiesbaden, 1966, p. 134[1].

[6] For example, Wilamowitz, *Pindaros*, 363[1] on O. 7. 13 says, 'κατέβαν . . . wird niemand auf eine Reise Pindars nach Rhodos deuten, der den Gebrauch von καταβαίνειν verfolgt'. But in I. 5. 21 he interprets ἔμολον literally of Pindar's journeying to Aigina (*S.B.B.*, 1909, p. 823,

repeated *Pindaros*, p. 200), 'Jetzt kam Pindar auch selbst herüber'. One remembers Housman's acid comments on the journeyings of Lucilius according to Marx, *C.Q.* i (1907), p. 74.

[7] Schadewaldt, p. 284[4].

[8] *Mus. Helv.* xxi (1964), p. 55[15] with many examples (but O. 8. 54, N. 1. 10, N. 7. 76 do not belong here).

[9] Radt, *Mnemosyne* ser. iv, xix (1966), 153[1] correctly claims this to be an 'Aorist der unmittelbaren Vergangenheit' (Wackernagel, *Vorlesungen*, i, p. 176): and ἔσταν... μελπόμενος N. 1. 19 is perhaps connected with ἱστάναι χορόν, 'I have taken up my position.' However, he goes perhaps too far in trying to suggest that we can limit the reference of such aorists to the immediate entrance of the chorus: the aorist does not exclude the possibility that the chorus comes from a distance.

[10] *S.B.B.*, 1908, p. 343.

vv. 1–10. The Muse is invited to join the chorus and come to Aigina.

v. 10. Imperative, 'Begin the song'.

v. 11. ἐγὼ δὲ κοινάσομαι.

v. 76. χαῖρε, φίλος.

v. 77. ἐγὼ τόδε τοι πέμπω . . . πόμ' ἀοίδιμον. Cf. σύμπεμψον at the end of *I*. 5.

The conclusion must be that Pindar formulates his song by convention roughly for a time, when his chorus is arriving at the place where they are to sing, but at a moment before the song is to be sung. The evidence of the poems is compatible with this view.[1]

P. 4. 1. σάμερον μὲν χρὴ . . .

O. 6. 28. δεῖ σάμερον ἐλθεῖν ἐν ὥρᾳ . . .

Paean 15. 1. τῷδ' ἐν ἄματι τερπνῷ . . .

II

O. 6. 87–92 runs as follows:

> ὄτρυνον νῦν ἑταίρους,
> Αἰνέα, πρῶτον μὲν "Ηραν Παρθενίαν κελαδῆσαι,
> γνῶναί τ' ἔπειτ', ἀρχαῖον ὄνειδος ἀλαθέσιν
> λόγοις εἰ φεύγομεν, Βοιωτίαν ὗν.
>   ἐσσὶ γὰρ ἄγγελος ὀρθός,
> ἠυκόμων σκυτάλα Μοισᾶν, γλυκὺς κρατὴρ ἀγαφθέγκτων ἀοιδᾶν·
> εἶπον δὲ μεμνᾶσθαι Συρακοσσᾶν τε καὶ 'Ορτυγίας.

Translation: 'Now rouse your comrades, Aineas, first to sing the praise of Hera the Maiden, and then to recognize whether we by truthful words escape the old taunt, Boiotian swine. For you are an honest messenger, a message stick of the fair haired Muses, a sweet mixing-bowl of loud sounding songs. Tell them to make mention of Syracuse . . .'.

The main problem is, how can Pindar tell Aineas to tell his comrades the chorus, to sing, when they are already in the middle of their song? At least, it seems to be a problem for us: Aristarchus explained quite reasonably that Aineas was the chorodidaskalos and seems to have thought that sufficient. Strange are the explanations of Boeckh and Hermann, how Aineas being

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[1] There are clearly examples which do not fit the general theory proposed here, but they are outnumbered by those that do. Instead of a future we find a present

O. 4. 14, *I*. 5. 59, αἰνέω

N. 8. 48, χαίρω . . . κόμπον ἰείς

P. 10. 4, κομπέω

N. 10. 31, ἀείδω

N. 1. 19, ἔσταν . . . μελπόμενος

Bacch. 5. 42, πιφαύσκω

and even an aorist αἴνησα *O*. 10. 100. But many of these exceptions are explicable on the following grounds:

(*a*) The future of the verb is non-existent or avoided, e.g. πιφαύσκω, μέλπομαι.

(*b*) The present denotes that the praise is not restricted to the moment of the song, it is continuing and general, on the lines of *P*. 5. 107:

ἄνδρα κεῖνον ἐπαινέοντι συνετοί· λεγό-
μενον ἐρέω.
which explains γνώτ' ἀείδω, *N*. 10. 31, *I*. 2. 12.

(*c*) The present expresses the anticipation of pleasure when the song is to be sung, so

O. 7. 8–9 ἱλάσκομαι . . . πέμπων

N. 8. 48 χαίρω . . . κόμπον ἰείς.

Especially a future participle may become a present, 'vom Zwecke von Gesandtschaften', explains Classen on Thuc. 6. 88. 10.

We have not enough of Alkman to say what his practice was, but it may be worth noting that fr. 1. 12 παρήσομες is more likely to be an Abbruchsformel, cf. διασω-πάσομαι *O*. 13. 91, rather than an example of the 'negative Ausdrucksweise' assumed by Page to be a praeteritio.

chorus leader is yet not chorus leader. Schroeder wanted him to be a πρόξενος. Wilamowitz[1] called him *Auftraggeber*, altered ἐσσὶ to ἔστι and invented a second song for Hera. He refused[2] to change his mind because a papyrus contradicted him, and ignored Schroeder's advice, translating against the scholiast εἶπον as an aorist indicative. Schadewaldt[3] calls Aineas *Festordner*, approves of Wilamowitz's *Heralied*, but explains more or less correctly how the imperatives are to be understood, although no one has thought to pursue the matter further.

1. The *Heralied* is a fiction: the praise of Hera, and the recognition of the falsity of the ancient taunt have been accomplished in the same moment as the desire for them was expressed, as, e.g., *P.* 3. 78, Bacch. 5. 179 f.

2. Aineas must be what Aristarchus says he is; he is the person who rouses the chorus to sing, the chorodidaskalos and perhaps the koryphaios. He is not a *Briefträger* or *Auftraggeber* or *Festordner*. He need never have been in Thebes; he is almost certainly not a Theban,[4] but a Stymphalian connected by family ties to the victor Hagesias. He is in short not primarily the messenger of Pindar, but of the Muses, cf. Theognis 769, *P.* 4. 277-9, *N.* 6. 57. The statements of Bowra[5] about Pindar as the messenger of song, of the Muses, etc., ignore, like most such statements, the fact that the song itself is the messenger of Pindar, *N.* 5. 3, or even that the Muse is the messenger of Pindar, *N.* 3. 3-9.

3. Schroeder and Schadewaldt produce a confusion of parallels for *Selbstanrede*: it is best to make clear exactly what we mean by this.[6] Pindar may address himself in several ways:

(a) by naming his θυμέ, στόμα, etc.
(b) by naming his Muse, his inspiration.
(c) by using a simple second person imperative without vocative,[7] or a first person imperative, or χρή.
(d) by addressing the chorus.
(e) by addressing the chorus leader.
(f) by addressing the object praised, e.g. *Paean* 6. 129.

Now by Pindar, I mean the element that is called ἐγώ in the poems; an element that implies in fact a vague combination of Pindar, chorus, and chorus leader:[8] in order to avoid confusion in what follows, I shall call this element ἐγώ, which

[1] *Isyllos von Epidauros*, Berlin, 1886, p. 168.
[2] *Pindaros*[2], p. 309.
[3] Schadewaldt, p. 296[1].
[4] In Pape–Benseler, our Aineas is listed as a Theban, which would appear to be false. The name is not very common, but it does occur most frequently in the northern Peloponnese, less frequently in Attica, and never, so far as I can determine, in Boeotia: from the northern Peloponnese,

(a) From Stymphalus, Xen. *An.* 4. 7. 13; Xen. *Hell.* 7. 3. 1, 5 (? = Aineas Tacticus).
(b) From Elis, an Iamid, and therefore of the same family as the victor in *O.* 6: Paus. 8. 10. 5, 6. 2. 4.
(c) From Arkadia, *S.E.G.* xi. 1043.
(d) From Corinth, Thuc. 4. 119; *I.G.* iv[2]. 1. 119, 49 (= *S.E.G.* xv. 39).

(e) From Epidaurus, *I.G.* iv[2]. 1. 102, 101 (= 103, 47). I do not know if he is the same as the second Corinthian Aineas.

The supposition that our Aineas was an Iamid, related to the victor, that he came from Stymphalus, would seem to be not unreasonable, in view of the fact that other names (Iamos, Teisamenos) were traditional in the family.

[5] *Pindar*, Oxford, 1965, 3 f.
[6] See A. Kambylis, *Anredeformen bei Pindar*, Festschrift Vourveris, Athens, 1964, pp. 95 ff.
[7] 'es wird eine ideale Person angeredet', Wackernagel, *Vorlesungen*, i. 109.
[8] It must not be forgotten that ἐγώ may include even the victor, so H. Fränkel, *D & P*, p. 543[12], and, more exactly, Bundy, *Studia Pindarica*, 2. 69.

though clumsy is at any rate not misleading. Theories, modern and ancient which try to make ἐγώ Pindar alone, or chorus alone or postulate a hymn sung by different groups, one representing Pindar and the other the chorus, I find untenable; H. Fränkel has put the matter succinctly.[1]

The first person singular or plural is in itself no help in determining the nature of ἐγώ. Consider, for example,

N. 4. 37: ἀντίτειν' ἐπιβουλίαις· σφόδρα δόξομεν.

I. 8. 7–8: μήτ' ἐν ὀρφανίᾳ πέσωμεν στεφάνων, μήτε κάδεα θεράπευε.

O. 2. 89: ἄγε, θυμέ· τίνα βάλλομεν;

and especially O. 6. 24: ὄφρα . . . βάσομεν ὄκχον, ἵκωμαί τε. There is no difference to be understood between first person singular and plural, unless deliberately stated, in such expressions, so that we may confidently assume that φεύγομεν may refer to Pindar, the chorus, or both.

Again we cannot easily say which of type (c) above is definitely a *Selbstanrede*: e.g. in P. 1. 81–92, the opening statements, καιρὸν εἰ φθέγξαιο . . . (v. 81) . . . μὴ παρίει καλά (v. 86), seem to be a *Selbstanrede*, but the row of imperatives which follow culminates in ὦ φίλε (v. 92) and clearly refers to Deinomenes. Similarly we cannot decide whether a statement like γένοι' οἷος ἐσσὶ μαθών P. 2. 72 is directed at Hieron, ἐγώ, or ἐς τὸν δεῖνα especially when we consider the wealth of vocatives in Pindar: in N. 7 five separate addressees are named.

Here we are primarily interested in types (d) and (e): there appear to be in the epinikians, excluding O. 6. 90, and fr. 107a, four passages where ἐγώ demonstrably separates itself from the chorus.

i. *P. 10. 56.*   'Εφυραίων
     ὅπ' ἀμφὶ Πηνειὸν γλυκεῖαν προχεόντων ἐμάν,

a clarification of vv. 5–6.

ii. *N. 2. 24–5.*   τόν, ὦ πολῖται, κωμάξατε . . .
                    ἀδυμελεῖ δ' ἐξάρχετε φωνᾷ. Cf. *Paean* 6. 122.

iii. *N. 3. 3–12.*

iv. *I. 8. 3.* Κλεάνδρῳ τις . . . ὦ νέοι . . . ἰὼν ἀνεγειρέτω κῶμον, where τις, if anyone at all, should be the chorus leader, cf. Bacch. 3. 97, 13. 190.

We have in the last example a suggestion of the further division of the ἐγώ/chorus leader/chorus type, of which the only two examples, presumably for personal reasons, are where the chorus leader is named, i.e. the *Selbstanrede* of type (e):

I. 2. 47.   ταῦτα, Νικάσιππ', ἀπόνειμον, ὅταν
                  ξεῖνον ἐμὸν ἔλθῃς,

i.e. Nikasippos fulfils, like Aineas, the function of an ἄγγελος. The command at the end of the song to the chorus leader is like the imperative to the chorus at the end of N. 2, or the self-addressed imperative at the end of I. 5.

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[1] *D & P*, p. 543[12] and p. 485[2]. But 'ich werde' does not imply 'man soll' but rather the other way round.

That ἐγώ on the other hand, though ideally representing poet+chorus, may make statements only appropriate to the chorus is obvious from *Paean* 4. 21; examples are to be found certainly in the epinikians as well, but our ignorance of the circumstances of performance prevents us in nearly all instances from determining this beyond all doubt.

ὄτρυνον and εἶπον are therefore unusual variants of the self-address, and this as I have suggested is merely in turn a variant of the conventional future: I mean

ὄτρυνον κελαδῆσαι = κελαδήσω.
εἶπον μεμνᾶσθαι = γνώσομαι O. 13. 3.

4. The epithets applied to Aineas are in no way strange. The explanation of ἄγγελος has already been given.[1] For σκυτάλα, an appropriate word to use in an area of Spartan influence, the scholiast quoted the words of Archilochus, which became proverbial: ἐρέω τιν᾽ ὑμῖν αἶνον, ὦ Κηρυκίδη, ἀχνυμένη σκυτάλη. Apostolius, 4. 68, explains: ἐπὶ τῶν λυπηρὰς ἀγγελίας ἀγγελλόντων. The phrase is vocative (Treu)[2] rather than nominative (Lasserre–Bonnard),[3] meaning apparently, 'you miserable news bringer'. It is perfectly possible that Pindar had Archilochus in mind here. On the other hand Aristophanes, Ach. 937

κρατὴρ κακῶν

may have been inspired by the Pindar passage: the metaphor owes something to the frequent image of the mixing-bowl of song.

If we then grant that the directive to the chorus, in whatever form, is not essentially different from statements of intention in the first person future, we could then view these phenomena as built-in stage directions, made possible by the temporal conception of the poem, cf. Carm. Pop. 18P.[4]

III

Wilamowitz, Schadewaldt, H. Fränkel, and many others have expressed their firm belief in the apologetic nature of N. 7. Lately S. Radt[5] and E. Tugendhat[6] have defended this view at length.

But the sheer improbability that Pindar should defend a supposed insult in a Paean commissioned for Delphians in Delphi against protests by Aiginetans is always underrated. H. Fränkel[7] has warned us that Schadewaldt by accumulating parallels, by emphasizing conventional elements, must force us to reduce gravely the special biographical and historical references seen by Wilamowitz. Unfortunately 'persönliche Absicht' was the very thing that Schadewaldt wanted to emphasize in N. 7: and he made no real attempt to question the assumptions of Wilamowitz.

[1] ὀρθός is explained by Bundy, Studia Pindarica, 2. 65.
[2] Archilochos, München, 1959, on fr. 81D.
[3] Archiloque (Budé) Paris, 1958, on fr. 224.
[4] When van Leeuwen, Pindarus Tweede Olympische Ode, Assen, 1964, p. 532, lumps Bundy in one basket with E. Schmid, and dismisses both their interpretations with the epithet 'rhetorical', he is unwittingly allying himself with what Stanford has called the shamanistic school of Pindaric interpretation (cf. Dornseiff's comment on Wilamowitz in Die Antike Mythenerzählung, Berlin, 1933, p. 81). The whole complex apparatus of witnessing, affirmation, appealing, invocation, etc. is an almost logical development

from the emphasis with which the poet is compelled to affirm the truth of his words. This machinery of persuasion one may justifiably call rhetorical. E. Schmid sought to impose a purely mechanical schema on the poems of Pindar. To discover the rules by which Pindar seeks to convince us has been on the contrary the aim of the school which began with Drachmann and continued with Schadewaldt.
[5] Pindars Zweiter und Sechster Paean, Amsterdam, 1958, pp. 84 ff.; see also Hoekstra, Mnemosyne ser. iv, xv, pp. 1 ff.
[6] Hermes lxxxviii (1960), pp. 385 ff.
[7] W & F, pp. 359 ff., a reprint of his review of Schadewaldt, Gnomon vi (1930), pp. 1 ff.

But Tugendhat[1] has recently applied the warning of Fränkel to $\mathcal{N}$. 7 and shown that many of the 'subjective' elements postulated earlier belong rather to the 'Programm'. Secondly Fränkel[2] has clearly shown that the relationship between $\mathcal{N}$. 7 and *Paean* 6 postulated by a scholiast is no more than a guess, in itself of no more value than the other nonsensical explanations assembled by Didymus. But both he and Tugendhat believe that the scholiast was none the less correct in his guess. We now know—as we should have known previously from Bacchylides—that Pindar could tell myths in almost the same words in different hymns, viz. *Paean* 20 and $\mathcal{N}$. 1. There is therefore no reason why he should not tell the Neoptolemos story from two different points of view adapted to those of his clients, especially as Tugendhat has shown that the common conception of Pindar's 'sincerity' is without any basis in fact. Therefore Tugendhat's own statement (p. 406) that the similarity of the narrative is meant to remind the hearers of *Paean* 6 is a *non sequitur*, especially since the first hearers were in Delphi and the second in Aigina, and the time difference may have been 10, 20, or 40 years. After correctly dismissing many supposed references to *Paean* 6 in *Nemean* 7, Tugendhat considers the apologetic interpretation of $\mathcal{N}$. 7 none the less justified by his interpretation of $\mathcal{N}$. 7. 102–3: he says (p. 404): 'An einer einzigen Stelle jedoch—und zwar am Schluss, wo Pindar auch sonst am ehesten eine unverhüllte persönliche Bemerkung anbringt[3]—kommt der Dichter unmittelbar auf seine Haltung im Paean zu sprechen: er werde niemals zugeben, Neoptolemos mit (starrsinnigen) Worten geschleift zu haben, doch dasselbe 3 und 4 Mal wieder aufzubringen, sei Hilflosigkeit.'

But this sentence, like everything that preceded it, contains no reference to *Paean* 6, and the translation is misleading.

(1) The future is conventional, and refers to what precedes in the ode.

(2) οὔ ποτε φάσει is not 'wird niemals zugeben': the οὔ ποτε belongs to what follows,[4] i.e. 'my heart declares that I have at no time (sc. in this ode) . . .'[5]

(3) Tugendhat and Fränkel both attack Dissen for translating ἀτρόποις by 'improbis', Tugendhat preferring 'unkonziliant, starrsinnig'. The scholiast understood the meaning to be 'ungehörig'[6] not for the reasons given by Fränkel, but because

    (a) he had no idea what the word could mean in the context any more than we have;

    (b) he remembered, reasonably enough, stock phrases like πρόσφορος ἀοιδά $\mathcal{N}$. 9. 7, and especially ποτίφορος δ' ἀγαθοῖσι μισθὸς οὗτος $\mathcal{N}$. 7. 63.[7]

The word is very rare and poetic. If it were to have an unparalleled meaning, that in itself would be no more surprising than the unparalleled meaning

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[1] *Hermes* lxxxviii (1960), pp. 385 ff.

[2] Ibid. lxxxix (1961), pp. 385 ff.

[3] This is simply not true: indeed it is a legitimate question whether there are any 'undisguised personal remarks' in Pindar at all.

[4] Kühner–Gerth, *Gr. Gr.*, 2. 180.

[5] The meaning of such an affirmation, 'Beteuerung der Wahrhaftigkeit', is excellently explained by Tugendhat, loc. cit., p. 395. Pindar is a μάρτυς (v. 49) on behalf of

Aigina and her heroes: Tugendhat does not apply his observation to v. 102: Pindar's conception of himself as a μάρτυς had already been discussed by Schadewaldt, pp. 312–14, and Illig, *Zur Form der pindarischen Erzählung*, Berlin, 1932. Fränkel, *Hermes*, 1961, p. 386 emphasizes that the scholiast at this point takes the words to refer to $\mathcal{N}$. 7, not *Paean* 6.

[6] So Fränkel, *Hermes*, 1961, p. 386.

[7] Cf. Schadewaldt, p. 278[1].

Fränkel[1] gives to ἀπότροπος *P*. 8. 94. Mackay[2] follows Wilamowitz in supporting a scholiast's unparalleled explanation of ἄτροπος in Callimachus, *Hymn* 4. 11 as ἀγεώργητος. In *N*. 7 it could mean 'impassive, intractable': ἄτροπος, says Tugendhat, p. 405, 'ist vor allem auch, wer sich den jeweiligen Umständen nicht anpasst (Theognis 218)'. It requires an effort of the imagination to think of the term applied to words rather than people, but Pindar must indeed have meant something very like the scholiast's ἀπεοικότως. Farnell's 'improper' is not an incorrect translation, merely ambiguous, and much nearer the truth than Bury's 'irrevocable' which Fränkel recommends to us.

(4) In ἑλκύσαι the scholiasts (like the lexicographers) find a metaphor from dogs tearing at a body.[3] They were thinking of the Homeric ἑλκέω and ἕλκος. But I find no metaphorical use of the word without further determining specification. If we are to assume that no metaphor from wrestling is intended as in *N*. 4. 94, or athletic exercise as in Plato, *Parm*. 135 d, we should see a general term for βιάζεσθαι perhaps derived from wrestling.[4]

(5) The sentence is troublesome because of the litotes, οὐ ... ἑλκύσαι ... I feel that here we have an example of another phenomenon that is peculiarly Pindaric, that which Fränkel[5] has called 'negative Ausdrucksweise'. Pindar in searching for synonyms for 'to praise, glorify, etc.' occasionally seeks refuge in a form of litotes which is not strictly logical.[6] Fränkel points out that

P. 9. 92   σιγαλὸν ἀμαχανίαν ἔργῳ φυγών

means in fact κελαδεννὰν ὕμνων καὶ αἴνου εὐμαχανίαν φάνας. But there are more extreme examples: οὐ ... κατελέγχω always represents γεραίρω, *P*. 8. 36, *I*. 8. 65, *I*. 3. 14, *O*. 8. 19. Most illuminating is the note of Wilamowitz[7] on *N*. 3. 15:

παλαίφατον ἀγοράν
οὐκ ἐλεγχέεσσιν Ἀριστοκλείδας τεάν / ἐμίανε κατ᾽ αἶσαν,

'Die Negation ist von dem Verbum so weit entfernt, dass es hart wird; τεὰν κατ᾽ αἶσαν kann sogar missverstanden werden: aber man begreift, warum diese Wortstellung gewählt ist, so bald man versucht anders zu ordnen.' But the real reason is that ἐλεγχέεσσιν has attracted οὐ, just as φάσει has done. In *N*. 7 it is clear that οὐ μέμφεται (v. 64) is a positive statement from *I*. 2. 20 οὐκ ἐμέμφθη, and means no more than αἰνέσει. I suggest therefore that οὐ ἑλκύσαι must also be considered as a positive statement, however illogical it may seem.

Pindar has then said, 'My heart will declare that it has not injured N. with intractable (?) words.' He meant, 'I claim that I have praised N. with fitting words.' To say more, he continues, would put me in ἀπορία, i.e. danger of appearing to exaggerate (cf. Tugendhat, p. 403[2]) and thereby arousing the κόρος of the audience, since ὕβρις is the mother of κόρος, *O*. 13. 10. The thought is much the same as *O*. 2. 92–5, where after an emphatic declaration (αὐδάσομαι

[1] In *D & P*, p. 571[14].

[2] *Mnemosyne* Suppl. 7, Leiden, 1962, p. 144[1].

[3] The scholiast, *pace* Fränkel, *Hermes*, 1961, p. 386, does not imply at this point παρέλκειν 'drag in', cf. scholia *N*. 9. 93a, 3 Dr.; this would be an unjustified deduction from the scholia on v. 1; I should imagine that the meaning is impossible in Pindar.

[4] Gardiner, *J.H.S.* xxv (1905), p. 266;

Headlam–Knox on Herondas 2. 71; the scholiast says ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐνυβρίσαι, and paraphrases v. 64, οὐ μέμψεταί μοι ὡς ἐνυβρίσαντι τῷ N.

[5] *D & P*, p. 510[18], and p. 530[44].

[6] Kühner–Gerth, *Gr. Gr.*, 1. 25, 2. 180, give enough examples to illustrate the innate lack of logic of Greek litotes.

[7] *Pindaros*, p. 276[3].

ἐνόρκιον λόγον) there follows a warning against κόρος, which as Schadewaldt[1] remarks is practically equivalent to φθόνος. If one bears this in mind, one will see the similarity with a great many other expressions of the type in Pindar,[2] and in doing so, will doubt that *N.* 7. 102–3 has anything whatsoever to do with *Paean* 6.

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[1] Schadewaldt, p. 288[2], perhaps mis-understood by Bundy, *Studia Pindarica*, i. 29[71].

[2] The conception of φθόνος is basic to an understanding of such passages:

(1) The poet is not φθονερός (therefore he readily praises).

(2) Others are φθονεροί (because ἀρετά attracts φθόνος).

(3) The poet must avoid rousing φθόνος in others (via κόρος).

The following standard thought-sequence results:

(*a*) I have praised X προσφόρως (ἀφθονή-τως, σὺν δίκᾳ, ἐν καιρῷ, etc.: i.e. I am not φθονερός like others).

(*b*) More (sc. praise) would be too much, for

(*c*) That would arouse κόρος (φθόνος, μῶμος, ἀπιστία, etc.).

Here he gives *a*+*b* and implies *c*. In *N.* 7. 50–3 he gives *a*+*b*+*c*. In *O.* 8. 54, cf. *N.* 7. 69–71, 75–6,

εἰ δ' ἐγὼ Μελησία ἐξ ἐγενείων κῦδος ἀνέδρα-μον ὕμνῳ,

μὴ βαλέτω με λίθῳ τραχεῖ φθόνος.

the *b*-element is represented by the conditional form: 'I have praised M; I hope I have not overdone it: I do not wish to arouse φθόνος.' But φθόνος motives 1 and 3 are clearly not always kept apart, and on occasion the poet can imply that he has mastered his own natural instinct towards φθόνος, cf. Jebb on Bacch. 13. 200.